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ToRTs-MENTAL DisTRESs-REcovERY AGAINST ORIGINAL WRONGDOER FOR 
FEAR OF CANCER CAUSED BY SUBSEQUENT MEDICAL ADVICE-Plaintiff, suffering 
from bursitis in the right shoulder, received X-ray treatments from de-
fendant physicians. Subsequent thereto, plaintiff's shoulder began to itch, 
scab, and blister for several years, a condition diagnosed as chronic radio-
dermatitis caused by the X-ray therapy. Approximately two years after the 
treatments, plaintiff was examined by a dermatologist who advised her 
to have her shoulder checked every six months because the area might be-
come cancerous. Plaintiff then developed a severe "cancerphobia," an ap-
prehension that she would ultimately develop cancer from the radiation 
burn. Plaintiff brought a malpractice suit against defendant physicians, 
seeking recovery for the physical injury and the mental distress caused by 
her later-developed fear of cancer. The trial court gave judgment for 
plaintiff and the appellate division affirmed. On appeal, held, affirmed, 
three judges dissenting in part. Plaintiff can recover for the mental suffer-
ing which resulted from information she received from a third party to 
whom she had gone for treatment of the original physical injury. Fer-
rara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y. (2d) 16, 152 N.E. (2d) 249 (1958). 
When a defendant's negligence inflicts an immediate physical injury, 
litigants have been allowed compensation for the accompanying mental 
distress. If the physical harm is not immediate but follows subsequently 
as a result of plaintiff's fright or shock, there is a division of authority. 
Some courts have granted a recovery for such consequences only if there has 
been some physical "impact" on the plaintiff's person, while a growing 
number of courts allow recovery without considering "impact." When de-
fendant's negligence causes only mental disturbance, without accompany-
ing physical injury, there is general agreement denying recovery, with 
certain exceptions as in the case of negligent mishandling of a corpse. 
The courts recognize intentional inflection of mental distress as a separate 
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tort.1 The plaintiff in the principal case sought recovery for her anxiety 
and worry over the possibility of contracting cancer.2 The elements of 
impact, physical injury, and accompanying pain and suffering were present. 
The decision, however, represents the first case in New York to allow re-
covery from the defendant for mental suffering arising from information 
the plaintiff received from a doctor to whom she later went for treat-
ment of the original physical injury caused by the defendant.3 On facts 
quite similar to those in the principal case, a Vermont court has allowed 
recovery,4 and in circumstances somewhat different a Texas court has 
approved recovery of damages for mental distress.5 In allowing recovery 
the court in the principal case faced two problems: proximate cause and 
proof. The first problem, proximate cause, seems a relatively simple one.6 
While in the principal case the mental anguish did not arise for two years, 
1 See generally on mental distress PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 38-47, 178-182 (1955); 1 
HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS 665-691 (1956); McCORMICK, DAMAGES 299-334 (1935); 1 STREET, 
FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 460-471 (1906); 25 C.J.S. 548-560 (1941); 15 AM. JUR., 
Damages §§175-189 (1938); Prosser, "Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New 
Tort,'' 37 MICH. L. REv. 874 (1939); Goodrich, "Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage," 
20 MICH. L. REv. 497 (1922); Plant, "Damages for Pain and Suffering," 19 Omo ST. L. J. 
200 (1958); Zelermyer, "Damages for Pain and Suffering," 6 SYRACUSE L. REv. 27 (1954); 
McNiece, "Psychic Injury and Tort Liability In New York," 24 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 1 (1949); 
Harper and McNeely, "A Re-examination of the Basis for Liability for Emotional Dis-
tress," 1938 Wis. L. REv. 426; Magruder, ".Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law 
of Torts,'' 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936); Throckmorton, "Damages for Fright," 34 HARV. 
L. REv. 260 (1921); Burdick, "Tort Liability for Mental Disturbance and Nervous Shock," 
5 COL. L. REv. 179 (1905). 
2 Recovery has generally been allowed for anxiety over complications from present 
physical injury. See Smith v. Boston and Maine R.R., 87 N.H. 246, 177 A. 729 (1935) 
(fear of paralysis); Serio v. American Brewing Co., 141 La. 290, 74 S. 998 (1917) (fear 
of hydrophobia following dog bite); Walker v. Boston and Maine R.R., 71 N.H. 271, 
51 A. 918 (1902) (fear of insanity); Watson v. Augusta Brewing Co., 124 Ga. 121, 52 
S.E. 152 (1905) (fear of death); Fink v. Dixon, 46 Wash. (2d) 794, 285 P. (2d) 557 (1955) 
(plaintiff, pregnant woman, physically injured ,by defendant, worried about effects on 
herself and her baby). 
3 See principal case at 252. However, the original tortfeasor has been held liable for 
further physical injuries suffered by plaintiff because of the negligence of the attending 
physician. See Primes v. Ross, 123 N.Y.S. (2d) 702 (1953); Sauter v. New York Central 
and Hudson River R. Co., 66 N.Y. 50 (1876). 
4 Halloran v. New England Telephone and Telegraph Co., 95 Vt. 273, 115 A. 143 
(1921), in which defendant's negligently-inflicted injury prevented plaintiff from having 
a necessary operation. When plaintiff learned this from her physician and suffered great 
mental anxiety, she was allowed to recover. 
5 See Kimbell v. Noel, (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) 228 S.W. (2d) 980, in which defendant's 
negligence caused a breast injury to plaintiff, with a resulting possibility of cancer. The 
court recognized the right to recover for mental anguish. However, in this case there 
was a subsequent physical harm to plaintiff, an exploratory operation to remove what 
was believed to be a malignancy. 
6See Milks v. Mdver, 264 N.Y. 267, 190 N.E. 487 (1934), which states the New York 
rule on proximate cause to be that the original wrongdoer is liable even for an increase 
in damages caused by subsequent medical treatment. This rule was deemed controlling 
in the principal case. 
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it is nevertheless reasonable for one suffering from a severe X-ray bum 
to see a physician. The advice of the dermatologist to watch for possible 
cancer and plaintiff's subsequent anxiety also seem foreseeable if not in-
evitable. Any defense the defendant might raise that the dermatologist 
here was an insulating intervening cause fails, once it is recognized that 
plaintiff acted foreseeably in going to the dermatologist. The second 
problem, proof, is much more serious and is complicated by the possible 
flood of litigation, both spurious and valid, which might accompany this 
decision. The court recognized the problem,7 but endorsed "public policy 
and common sense" as the ultimate limitation on recovery.8 The opinion 
indicates a confidence in the court's ability to distinguish valid and spurious 
claims, and an attitude that the possibility of false claims should not negate 
recovery in valid cases.9 Though there has been disagreement over the 
reliability of evidence admitted to prove mental distress,1° the contem-
porary medical position is that mental distress is rarely unaccompanied 
by physical reaction, and physical injury seldom not attended with mental 
distress.11 Although it follows therefore that mental distress can be sub-
stantiated by evidence of physical injury or reaction, which is much easier 
to prove thari mental suffering, it is not universally agreed that all prob-
lems of proof are now solved for purposes of litigation.12 Nevertheless 
courts today accept in increasing number previously spurned medical 
opinion, such as the concurrent physical injury-mental distress thesis, 
and doctors are demonstrating a greater willingness to testify in litigations. 
These factors, coupled with the limitation provided by "public policy and 
7 See principal case at 252: "Mental disturbance is easily simulated, and courts which 
are plagued with fraudulent personal injury claims may well be unwilling to open the 
door to an even more dubious field" [quoting from PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 212-213 (1955)]. 
8 See principal case at 253. Although the court split 4-3, objective analysis of the 
mind is the turning point in many areas of the law: e.g., malicious prosecution, libel, 
slander, assault, alienation of affections, fraud cases in proving scienter. 
9 The court's quick dismissal of the problem of spurious claims (and the comple-
mentary problem of a flood of litigation) is not without justification. Similar worries 
in granting recoveries in novel fact situations have proved unfounded. Thus, following 
a hesitant grant of recovery for shock for the •first time, L. J. Atkin in Hambrook v. Stokes 
Bros., I K.B. 141 (1925), said at 158: "I find only about half-a-dozen cases of direct shock 
reported in about thirty years." See also Gulf Ry. Co. v. Hayter, 93 Tex. 239, 54 S.W. 944 
(1900). 
10 Representing contrary opinions, see Lake Erie and Western R. Co. v. Johnson, 
191 Ind. 479, 133 N.E. 732 (1922), and PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 38 (1955). 
11 ELDREDGE, -MODERN TORT PROBLEMS 76 (1941). See also PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 177 
(1955). 
12 See McNiece, "Psychic Injury and Tort Liability in New York," 24 ST. JoHN's L. 
REv. 1 at 74-75 (1949): "With the possible exception of a few standardized psychometric 
tests of intelligence and broad personality categories and the electroencephalograph useful 
in epilepsy cases, there are no reliable objective guides.'' -Moreover, it is not difficult 
for both parties to the complaint to get medical testimony reaching diametrically op-
posed conclusions. 
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common sense,"13 provide a stronger foundation for court decisions. The 
court then appears to be on firm ground in rejecting the arguments con-
cerning difficulty of proof. The result agrees with current trends to 
recognize mental distress alone as an actionable injury,14 and the diminu-
tion of the requirement of physical impact for recovery in several states.15 
The liberal approach of the court, in rejecting objections proved largely un-
tenable in the past and in recognizing advanced medical knowledge 
particularly in the field of psychiatry, is refreshing and reasonable. The 
right to peace of mind is fast becoming a well-protected interest in our 
courts today. 
Paul Gerding 
13 See note 8 supra. 
H See PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 38 (1955). See also Farage, "Mental Distress as an 
Independent Basis for Recovery," 40 DICK. L. REv. 1 (1935). 
15 See ELDREDGE, MonERN TORT PROBLEMS 72-73 (1941). See also Harper and McNeely, 
"A Re-examination of the Basis for Liability for Emotional Distress," 1938 WIS. L. REv. 
426. 
